This paper explores the Samaritan’s Dilemma faced by international donors in Uganda, where the ethical imperative to alleviate
poverty through budget support intersects with the persistent risk of fund misappropriation. Drawing on recent governance
assessments, donor audit reports, and interviews with Ugandan policymakers and development partners, the study examines how
fears of corruption shape aid modalities and the effectiveness of poverty-reduction programs. The findings reveal a donor landscape
increasingly marked by conditionalities, parallel implementation units, and a shift toward project aid—measures that, while mitigating
fiduciary risk, may undermine national ownership and long-term institutional capacity. By reframing the dilemma through the lens of
principal-agent theory and moral hazard, the paper argues that excessive risk aversion can paradoxically entrench the very
governance failures donors seek to avoid. The study concludes with recommendations for a recalibrated approach that balances
accountability with trust, emphasizing adaptive safeguards, mutual accountability frameworks, and locally led anti-corruption
mechanisms.