Strengthening special and differential treatment for developing countries in the WTO: A mapping ofselected agreement-specific proposals on S&D

Abstract

This paper presents a systematic mapping and analysis of recent agreement-specific proposals aimed at strengthening Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) provisions for developing countries within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on WTO negotiating documents and member submissions, we catalogue and categorise proposals tabled between 2019 and 2024 across key covered agreements—including Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

Four recurrent objectives:

Combining legal-textual analysis with qualitative coding, we identify four recurrent objectives of the proposals:

Extending transition periods and compliance flexibilities;

Tightening substantive thresholds (e.g., de minimis levels, export-competitiveness criteria) that trigger obligations;

Expanding the scope of available technical assistance and capacity-building; and

Introducing monitoring and transparency mechanisms to improve the enforceability of S&DT.

Concentration of proposals:

The mapping reveals a high concentration of proposals originating from the African Group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the least-developed-country (LDC) coalition, with limited convergence among emerging economies.

Agreement-specific patterns:

We find that while Agriculture and SPS proposals emphasise differentiated timelines and safeguard flexibilities, TBT and TRIPS submissions focus on technology transfer and longer implementation windows. SCM discussions centre on raising the export-subsidy phase-out thresholds for low-income members.

Three critical gaps:

The paper concludes by highlighting three critical gaps:

(i) the absence of a unified graduation framework to determine S&DT eligibility;

(ii) the lack of binding dispute-settlement remedies for non-compliance with S&DT obligations; and

(iii) insufficient integration of cross-cutting development indicators (e.g., food security, climate vulnerability) into agreement-specific flexibilities.

Proposed tool:

We propose a matrix-based tool that negotiators can use to benchmark new S&DT language against existing provisions and evolving development priorities.

IPRAA WORKING PAPER 47

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