Recent proposals for a “two-tiered” or “dual-track” trade system—typically combining a conventional MFN regime with a second tier
of deeper, preferential disciplines for coalitions of “willing” members—are often marketed as a pragmatic response to gridlock in the
WTO and the rise of geoeconomic rivalry. This paper asks whether the architecture, normative implications, and distributional effects
of such proposals are genuinely novel or merely a re-branding of long-standing instruments (GATT Article XXIV, the Enabling
Clause, critical-mass agreements, and open plurilaterals). Using a combination of an original dataset of 197 preferential initiatives
(1957-2023) with process-tracing of four contemporary negotiations (CPTPP, IPEF, EU Carbon Border Adjustment, and the
proposed G7 “Climate Club”), we find that the current wave of two-tiered designs differs from historical precedents in three respects:
(1) issue-specific rather than tariff-based differentiation, (2) an explicit linkage between second-tier concessions and extra-territorial
regulatory standards, and (3) the use of conditional MFN extension that can be revoked for non-participants. Yet these innovations
largely replicate earlier patterns of exclusion and power asymmetry; quantitative simulations show that welfare gains accrue
disproportionately to rule-makers, while outsiders face terms-of-trade losses that exceed those observed under classic FTAs. The
paper concludes that the two-tiered turn is evolutionary, not revolutionary: its institutional novelty is thin, but its political salience is
high precisely because it reframes old forms of discrimination as cooperative minilateralism.