The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)—formally established in 2015 and operational since July 2024—unites the Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), and Southern African Development Community (SADC)
into a market of 800 million people and US$1.88 trillion GDP, making it one of Africa’s largest regional trading blocs
. This paper critically assesses how “free” the TFTA actually is by interrogating the gap between its liberalisation commitments and
on-the-ground trade realities. Using a mixed-methods approach that combines legal-text analysis of the Agreement, newly-released
customs data, and 42 semi-structured interviews with customs officials, traders, and policymakers, we construct a Freedom Index
that weights tariff elimination, rules of origin, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and behind-the-border measures.

Our findings reveal a partial liberalisation: while 85 % of tariff lines are scheduled for zero-duty by 2032, sensitive
products—including sugar, textiles, and motor vehicles—remain shielded by lengthy phase-outs and exclusion lists that cover up to
15 % of intra-regional trade. Rules of origin are complex and inconsistently applied; only 38 % of surveyed firms report seamless
certificate-of-origin clearance. NTBs—especially sanitary-phytosanitary checks, roadblocks, and opaque licensing—cost traders an
estimated 6.2 % of shipment value, effectively eroding half of the tariff preference margins. Services liberalisation lags further: just
five sub-sectors have undertaken commitments, and mutual recognition agreements for professional qualifications cover <10 % of
the bloc’s workforce. The principle of variable geometry—allowing different speeds of integration—has produced a fragmented
tariff regime; overlapping membership in COMESA, EAC, and SADC customs unions creates conflicting external tariffs and double-
certification requirements that raise transaction costs by 4–7 %. Regression analysis shows that small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) face NTB-related delays 1.8 times longer than large multinationals, indicating discriminatory implementation. Paradoxically,
while the TFTA is designed to be building block for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), its current design risks
entrenching rather than dissolving regional silos.
We conclude that the TFTA is “freer” on paper than in practice. To unlock its developmental potential, member states must (1)
accelerate the reduction of exclusion lists, (2) harmonise rules of origin across the three RECs, (3) operationalise the Tripartite NTB
Monitoring Mechanism with legally binding timelines, and (4) extend services liberalisation to key logistics and professional services.
Only then will the TFTA transition from a preferential trade area to a truly free trade area.