Recent WTO negotiations have revived interest in “market-access-for-development” packages that tie deeper tariff cuts in agriculture
to flexibilities for low-income members. This paper develops a quantitative framework to evaluate whether such proposals can
simultaneously expand trade, safeguard food security and foster value-chain upgrading in developing countries. Calibrating a partial-
equilibrium model on bound and applied tariffs, ad-valorem equivalents of TRQs, and new data on trade costs for 46 agricultural
products in 119 WTO members, we simulate three prominent market-access proposals: (i) the G-33 call for Special Products and an
expanded Special Safeguard Mechanism; (ii) the Cairns Group formula for proportional tariff reductions with longer staging for LDCs;
and (iii) the EU–ACP initiative that consolidates preferences in exchange for tighter disciplines on export subsidies. We find that the
G-33 option yields the smallest global welfare gains (US$5.2 bn) but preserves policy space for 90 % of low-income members’ tariff
lines; the Cairns formula maximizes export revenue for Latin American and African suppliers (+US$12.4 bn), yet erodes preference
margins for ACP countries; while the EU–ACP hybrid strikes a balance, raising developing-country tariff revenues by 3 % and cutting
nontariff distortions by one-third. Sensitivity analysis shows that the inclusion of an indexation clause for import surges and a
plurilateral transparency mechanism for SPS measures is critical to prevent back-sliding. We conclude that a development-oriented
trading system must embed calibrated flexibilities rather than uniform liberalization and outline a rule-based architecture that links
graduated market access to verifiable supply-side support.