The growing evidence of market failure, uncertainties in international cooperation, and the complexities of the problems of global inequalities have made special and differential treatment of developing countries (S&DT) not only increasingly necessary, but also increasingly difficult. In this paper, we examine the S&DT measures in the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) in addressing the delicate balance between the concerns of developing countries and fostering the TFA’s objectives of expediting the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.

We find that, while the S&DT appears, on the face of it, to offer flexibility for developing countries—especially the least developed countries—in the implementation of the TFA, this flexibility has been eroded by conditioning assistance and support for capacity building on notification of commitments.

The dilemma:

The linking of support to commitment creates not only a dilemma for developing countries on the timing of commitment (implementation) but also exposes them to risks of taking on increasing commitments before prerequisite capacity is in place.

Conclusion:

Given the “best endeavour” nature of the relevant provisions, it is not apparent that the benefits of implementing the Agreement will outweigh its costs if developed countries renege on their promise to provide assistance and support for capacity building.