The Cotonou Agreement (2000) between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states initiated a
paradigm shift from non-reciprocal trade preferences to reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) compatible with World
Trade Organization rules. This paper examines the Agreement’s implications for the complex landscape of regional trade
arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa, where overlapping memberships in blocs such as COMESA, SADC and the EAC have
historically generated contradictory trade rules and hindered deeper integration. Using comparative case analysis and recent
negotiation data, we argue that the EPA process—by requiring ACP countries to negotiate as consolidated regional groupings—acts
as an external catalyst for rationalizing these fragmented architectures. However, the paper also highlights distributional tensions:
potential losses of tariff revenues, asymmetrical market-access gains, and divergent interests between coastal and land-locked
economies risk undermining cohesion. Drawing on primary documents and stakeholder interviews, we conclude that while the
Cotonou framework offers a unique opportunity to lock in more coherent and WTO-consistent regional trade agendas, its
developmental impact will depend on flexible implementation schedules, robust compensatory mechanisms and strengthened
regional institutions capable of mediating intra-African conflicts of interest.