This paper explores the Samaritan’s Dilemma faced by international donors in Uganda, where the ethical imperative to alleviate poverty through budget support intersects with the persistent risk of fund misappropriation. Drawing on recent governance assessments, donor audit reports, and interviews with Ugandan policymakers and development partners, the study examines how fears of corruption shape aid modalities and the effectiveness of poverty-reduction programs.

Findings:

The findings reveal a donor landscape increasingly marked by conditionalities, parallel implementation units, and a shift toward project aid—measures that, while mitigating fiduciary risk, may undermine national ownership and long-term institutional capacity.

Theoretical reframing:

By reframing the dilemma through the lens of principal-agent theory and moral hazard, the paper argues that excessive risk aversion can paradoxically entrench the very governance failures donors seek to avoid.

Conclusion and recommendations:

The study concludes with recommendations for a recalibrated approach that balances accountability with trust, emphasizing adaptive safeguards, mutual accountability frameworks, and locally led anti-corruption mechanisms.